@mulmoclaude/core@4.9.3
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo malicious install-time execution or stealthy exfiltration was found. The package nevertheless provides a guarded first-party Claude skill installation mechanism, which warrants a warning under the extension lifecycle policy.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Its collection operations mirror staged content into the active .claude/skills directory.
- Its Google OAuth flow sends authorization data and refresh tokens to a Mulmo cloud-function broker.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare hook.
- The skill bridge restricts paths to allowlisted files and validates the skill slug.
- The broker requires HTTPS except for loopback and validates the Google consent host.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-BkIKvdh0.jsView on unpkg · L1448Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@4.9.3.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@4.9.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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