@mulmoclaude/core@5.11.3
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a guarded runtime capability that installs skill content into Claude’s workspace extension directory, so a warning is appropriate. The inspected behavior does not establish malicious activity or an install-hook attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Registry imports mirror selected bundle files into the workspace’s `.claude/skills` directory when a staging tree exists.
- The bridge copies staged skill content into the active Claude skill directory; schema authoring also invokes the mirror.
- The registry import function is runtime-invoked; package scripts shown are build, typecheck, test, and lint.
- The mirror is disabled when no staging tree exists, and the importer mirrors only files selected by its allowlist.
- No install-time mutation or confirmed credential transfer was identified in the inspected paths.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-CbwHtcwk.jsView on unpkg · L1447Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@5.11.3.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@5.11.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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