@mulmoclaude/core@5.6.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source shows a user-invoked registry import that can add skill content to `.claude/skills`, creating an agent capability risk. No automatic lifecycle mutation or concrete malicious behavior was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json lists build, typecheck, test, and lint scripts, with no install lifecycle hook.
- The registry importer writes validated bundle files into workspace skill directories and mirrors selected files into `.claude/skills`.
- The skill bridge targets `.claude/skills` and copies staged skill content there; the server bundles describe imported skills and their views.
- The Google entrypoint loads ordinary library dependencies; the inspected excerpt shows no install-time action.
- The import code can place registry-provided skill content in Claude’s discoverable skill directory, which can affect later agent behavior when a user invokes the import feature.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-B79IxEM6.cjsView on unpkg · L1450Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@5.6.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@5.6.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.