@mulmoclaude/core@5.7.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source supports ordinary package behavior, with no install-time trigger or concrete attack chain. The skill mirroring is workspace-scoped and tied to explicit registry or authoring operations.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes build, typecheck, test, and lint scripts, with no install lifecycle script in its scripts block.
- The skill bridge limits mirrored files to named skill files and safe action templates, and targets the workspace’s .claude/skills directory.
- Registry mirroring handles a specific skill slug and allowlisted bundle files; the inspected source shows no package-install trigger for that operation.
- The Google broker uses a package-aligned default endpoint and permits a configurable override; the inspected URL validation requires HTTPS or loopback.
- The discovery and prompt-safety files inspected show ordinary local module imports, not a runtime dependency bridge or an attack.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-CwBXvtyn.cjsView on unpkg · L1450Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@5.7.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@5.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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