@mulmoclaude/core@5.8.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the reviewed agent integration is part of a user-invoked workspace collection import flow with a narrow mirror allowlist. The scanner signals did not establish a concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest defines build, typecheck, test, and lint scripts but no install lifecycle hook.
- Registry import places a skill in the workspace and mirrors it into `.claude/skills` when a staging tree exists; this is an explicit collection import flow.
- The bridge limits mirrored files to skill metadata and safe action templates, and confines slugs to a restricted format.
- The inspected server bundles describe workspace collection and skill handling; no concrete attack behavior was established.
- Discovery, prompt-safety, and Google bundle excerpts show module imports, not evidence of a malicious payload.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-CwBXvtyn.cjsView on unpkg · L1450Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@5.8.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@5.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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