registry / @mutmutco/claude-plugin / 4.5.162
@mutmutco/claude-plugin@4.5.162
MMI workflow skills and org gates delivery.
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install hooks or concrete attack behavior. The observed runtime telemetry is limited to CLI usage metadata, and the agent-directory finding is Git cleanliness logic rather than an agent configuration write.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Running a CLI command triggers telemetry; Git cleanliness checks trigger the directory filtering logic.
Impact
No credential transfer, agent configuration mutation, or other concrete attack impact was established.
Mechanism
Telemetry posts command name, version, CI status, and operating system to the configured MMI hub. Agent-directory paths are classified for Git status filtering without configuration writes.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no install hooks or concrete attack behavior. The observed runtime telemetry is limited to CLI usage metadata, and the agent-directory finding is Git cleanliness logic rather than an agent configuration write.
Evidence
package.jsoncli/dist/main.cjs
Network endpoints1
tqxxwzftic.execute-api.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 95.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest contains no install lifecycle scripts and identifies this as the MMI workflow plugin.
- CLI telemetry is sent during command execution and contains only the command name, version, CI status, and operating system; it can be disabled with MMI_TELEMETRY=off.
- The telemetry endpoint is the MMI hub, consistent with the package homepage.
- The agent-directory paths are used to filter Git cleanliness results; the inspected code does not modify agent configuration.
Evidence against
- Runtime telemetry is enabled by default unless disabled, and its destination can be overridden with MMI_HUB_URL.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcecli/dist/main.cjsView file
39Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L39: function globalDispatcher() {
L40: return globalThis[UNDICI_GLOBAL_DISPATCHER_SYMBOL];
L41: }
...
L80: try {
L81: stream.write("", () => resolve7());
L82: } catch {
...
L88: await Promise.race([
L89: Promise.all([flushStream(process.stdout), flushStream(process.stderr)]),
L90: new Promise((resolve7) => {
...
L140: CLI_EXIT_WATCHDOG_MS = (() => {
L141: const testOverride = Number(process.env.MMI_CLI_TEST_EXIT_WATCHDOG_MS);
L142: return process.env.NODE_ENV === "test" && Number.isFinite(testOverride) && testOverride >= 25 ? testOverride : 1e4;
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
cli/dist/main.cjsView on unpkg · L3939function globalDispatcher() {
L40: return globalThis[UNDICI_GLOBAL_DISPATCHER_SYMBOL];
L41: }
...
L80: try {
L81: stream.write("", () => resolve7());
L82: } catch {
...
L88: await Promise.race([
L89: Promise.all([flushStream(process.stdout), flushStream(process.stderr)]),
L90: new Promise((resolve7) => {
...
L140: CLI_EXIT_WATCHDOG_MS = (() => {
L141: const testOverride = Number(process.env.MMI_CLI_TEST_EXIT_WATCHDOG_MS);
L142: return process.env.NODE_ENV === "test" && Number.isFinite(testOverride) && testOverride >= 25 ? testOverride : 1e4;
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
cli/dist/main.cjsView on unpkg · L39Findings
2 Critical6 High5 Medium4 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationcli/dist/main.cjs
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationcli/dist/main.cjs
HighChild Processcli/dist/main.cjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationcli/dist/main.cjs
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitycli/dist/main.cjs
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedcli/dist/main.cjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritycli/dist/main.cjs
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturecli/dist/main.cjs
MediumDynamic Requirecli/dist/index.cjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperbin/mmi-cli.cmd
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mutmutco/claude-plugin@4.5.162.
See all versions of @mutmutco/claude-plugin for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mutmutco/claude-plugin@4.5.162 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.