--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@mutmutco/cli/v/4.3.40" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@mutmutco/cli/v/4.3.40.md" package: "@mutmutco/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@mutmutco/cli@4.3.40 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "4.3.40" --- # @mutmutco/cli@4.3.40 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — The endpoint receives a reusable GitHub credential and command-use metadata. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 4.3.40 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. A Hub-using CLI command obtains the user's GitHub credential and transmits it to a hard-coded third-party API endpoint. Every command also sends command, version, CI status, and operating system telemetry by default. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-11T09:18:18.289Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-11T09:19:36.841Z - **Download time:** 508 ms - **Static scan time:** 3655 ms - **AI review time:** 74388 ms - **Total time:** 78552 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** A Hub-using CLI command obtains the user's GitHub credential and transmits it to a hard-coded third-party API endpoint. Every command also sends command, version, CI status, and operating system telemetry by default. - **Trigger:** Running mmi-cli commands; Hub-authenticated operations activate credential transmission. - **Impact:** The endpoint receives a reusable GitHub credential and command-use metadata. - **Evidence paths:** dist/main.cjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-11T09:19:36.841Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** GitHub token collection and remote bearer-token exchange - **Attack narrative:** The CLI reads GH\_TOKEN, GITHUB\_TOKEN, or the output of gh auth token. It then posts that value as an Authorization bearer credential to a hard-coded AWS API Gateway Hub endpoint to obtain a session. Independently, its command pre-action hook sends telemetry for each command by default. The absence of an install hook limits the trigger to CLI use, but the credential transfer is concrete and does not require an explicit credential-export command. - **Rationale:** This package contains a concrete path that collects a local GitHub credential and transmits it to a hard-coded remote endpoint, plus default telemetry on every command. The lack of lifecycle hooks does not remove the credential-exfiltration risk when the CLI is run. - **Files touched:** dist/main.cjs - **Network endpoints:** https://tqxxwzftic.execute-api.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/auth/session, https://tqxxwzftic.execute-api.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/telemetry/cli-call ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** The CLI reads GitHub credentials from environment variables or gh auth., It sends that credential as a bearer token to its hard-coded Hub endpoint., Every command action automatically sends telemetry unless the user sets an opt-out variable. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no npm lifecycle hook, so installation alone does not trigger the behavior., The package exposes a CLI entry point rather than import-time execution. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @mutmutco/cli@4.3.40. - Avoid installing @mutmutco/cli@4.3.40. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/main.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L201: var import_node_events = require("node:events"); L202: var import_node_child_process = __toESM(require("node:child_process"), 1); L203: var import_node_path = __toESM(require("node:path"), 1); ``` ### 3. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4: // src/client-version.ts L5: var import_node_fs = require("node:fs"); L6: var import_node_path = require("node:path"); ``` ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/main.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3526: // src/cli-shared.ts L3527: var import_node_child_process2 = require("node:child_process"); L3528: var import_node_fs5 = require("node:fs"); ... L3531: // src/hub-url.ts L3532: var DEFAULT_HUB_URL = "https://tqxxwzftic.execute-api.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com"; L3533: function defaultHubUrl() { L3534: return process.env.MMI_HUB_URL || DEFAULT_HUB_URL; L3535: } ``` ### 8. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/main.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L53: * Constructs the CommanderError class L54: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L55: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L201: var import_node_events = require("node:events"); L202: var import_node_child_process = __toESM(require("node:child_process"), 1); L203: var import_node_path = __toESM(require("node:path"), 1); ... L1222: this._outputConfiguration = { L1223: writeOut: (str) => import_node_process.default.stdout.write(str), L1224: writeErr: (str) => import_node_process.default.stderr.write(str), ... L1264: * @returns {Command[]} L1265: * @private L1266: */ ``` ### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 10. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 95.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 12. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/main.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @mutmutco/cli@4.3.39 matchedPath = dist/main.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QG11dG11dGNvL2NsaQ:4.3.39 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 14. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/main.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 1837d210bc699bb4 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @mutmutco/cli@4.3.39 matchedPath = dist/main.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QG11dG11dGNvL2NsaQ:4.3.39 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 1 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 4 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1 ### Published dependency entries - commander ^15.0.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @mutmutco/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 4.3.40 - **License:** UNLICENSED - **Version published:** 2026-09-11T09:16:44.782Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T05:27:10.260Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-08T16:55:01.276Z - **Known versions:** 218 - **Latest version:** 4.5.105 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** MMI Future CLI — the org dev toolbox and shared cross-IDE engine for every registry-declared MMI coding surface. - **Author:** MMI Future - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22 - **Artifact files:** 4 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,139,422 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()