--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nac3/forge-cli" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nac3/forge-cli/v/1.2.5.md" package: "@nac3/forge-cli" report_status: "published" title: "@nac3/forge-cli@1.2.5 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.2.5" --- # @nac3/forge-cli@1.2.5 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse - **Selected version:** 1.2.5 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Review flagged AI-agent configuration or capability changes. This remains warn-only unless evidence shows foreign-agent hijack through preinstall/install/postinstall, hidden persistence, exfiltration, remote code execution, or other concrete malicious behavior. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 78.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-07T21:34:37.325Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-07T21:38:10.223Z - **Download time:** 762 ms - **Static scan time:** 7901 ms - **AI review time:** 204234 ms - **Total time:** 212898 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** When a paired phone is present, the running chat server can relay activity to an external worker. Panel-generated artifacts are written to the active project's docs directory. - **Trigger:** Run the yf chat workflow with a paired mobile device, or invoke a panel artifact action. - **Impact:** Activity payloads and bearer authentication reach the relay; generated content can create or overwrite project documentation. - **Evidence paths:** dist/chat/server.js, dist/relay/relay\_client.js, dist/chat/board\_artifacts.js, dist/commands/app.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-07T21:38:10.223Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Paired-device event relay and agent-originated project document persistence. - **Rationale:** The package has no automatic npm install lifecycle hook, and the inspected credentialed API call is tied to an explicit CLI command. However, automatic pairing-gated relay behavior and server-side project writes leave a meaningful capability risk that cannot be treated as clean under incomplete static coverage. - **Files touched:** docs/\.html|md, docs/flows/\.svg, docs/flows/\.bpmn.json, ~/.yujin-forge/bridge/bridge.json - **Network endpoints:** https://yujin-hito4.yujinapp.workers.dev/v1/relay/\, https://slack.com/api/chat.postMessage ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 78.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The CLI automatically enables a mobile relay after a phone has been paired., The relay posts event payloads and bearer authentication to a fixed external worker., Chat-panel actions persist generated documents into the current project., The CLI can send vault-held service credentials to third-party APIs for requested actions. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no npm preinstall, install, or postinstall hook., The relay is gated by pairing or an explicit environment override., The external app request shown is an explicit Slack notify command, not background credential collection., The native opener restricts URLs to HTTP(S) and blocks project-path escapes and executable extensions. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @nac3/forge-cli@1.2.5. - Review the evidence and your use of @nac3/forge-cli@1.2.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/codegen/e2e.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 390 ``` ### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/chat/project\_slug.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L78: /* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports */ L79: const fsSync = require('node:fs'); L80: try { ``` ### 5. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/chat/instance\_lock.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L33: const r = path.resolve(root); L34: return process.platform === 'win32' ? r.toLowerCase() : r; L35: } ... L56: try { L57: const h = JSON.parse(readFileSync(p, 'utf-8')); L58: if (h && typeof h.pid === 'number') ... L112: + ' ' + holder.root + '\n' L113: + ' (PID ' + holder.pid + ', panel en http://127.0.0.1:' + holder.port + ')\n\n' L114: + 'Abri esa instancia, o abri Forge en OTRA carpeta. Si estas seguro de que\n' ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/app.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L103: return missingSlot(opts, 'slack_bot_token'); L104: const r = await fetch('https://slack.com/api/chat.postMessage', { L105: method: 'POST', ... L110: }, L111: body: JSON.stringify({ channel, text: message }), L112: }); ... L135: } L136: const from = opts.from ?? process.env.TWILIO_FROM ?? ''; L137: if (!from) { ... L140: const url = 'https://api.twilio.com/2010-04-01/Accounts/' + sid + '/Messages.json'; L141: const auth = Buffer.from(sid + ':' + token).toString('base64'); L142: const body = new URLSearchParams({ To: to, From: from, Body: message }); ``` ### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/chat/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/chat/server.js: * leak the API key + the project source-aware system prompt. if (!opts.agentMode && !opts.claude && !opts.allowDuplicateRoot) { * Tests inject `opts.claude` directly and bypass this branch. */ cliOpts['timeoutMs'] = (await readLimitsConfig()).claude_cli_timeout_ms; let claude = opts.claude ?? await buildClaudeClient(activeChatProvider); if (opts.claude) if (!opts.claude && activeChatProvider === 'claude-code-cli') { await handleWriteFile(req, res, ctx); ``` ### 11. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/core/desktop\_open.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L23: */ L24: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L25: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L46: function shellOpen(target) { L47: if (process.platform === 'win32') { L48: /* cmd start: the first quoted arg is the window TITLE (empty), then ... L60: return process.platform === 'linux' L61: && !process.env.DISPLAY && !process.env.WAYLAND_DISPLAY; L62: } ... L74: try { L75: const j = JSON.parse(readFileSync(absPath, 'utf-8')); L76: if (j.url && /^https?:\/\//i.test(j.url)) ``` ### 12. High: Copied Package Dependency Bridge - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 83.0% - **Path:** dist/chat/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript package = @nac3/forge-cli; repositoryIdentity = yujin-forge; dependency = qrcode L4053: catch { /* best-effort */ } L4054: const QRCode = (await import('qrcode')).default; L4055: /* PND-047 follow-up -- the pairing payload grew (the per-handle key is ``` ### 13. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/app.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/bin/yf.js -> dist/commands/app.js L103: return missingSlot(opts, 'slack_bot_token'); L104: const r = await fetch('https://slack.com/api/chat.postMessage', { L105: method: 'POST', ... L110: }, L111: body: JSON.stringify({ channel, text: message }), L112: }); ... L135: } L136: const from = opts.from ?? process.env.TWILIO_FROM ?? ''; L137: if (!from) { ... L140: const url = 'https://api.twilio.com/2010-04-01/Accounts/' + sid + '/Messages.json'; L141: const auth = Buffer.from(sid + ':' + token).toString('base64'); L142: const body = new URLSearchParams({ To: to, From: from, Body: message }); ``` ### 14. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/app.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/bin/yf.js -> dist/commands/app.js L103: return missingSlot(opts, 'slack_bot_token'); L104: const r = await fetch('https://slack.com/api/chat.postMessage', { L105: method: 'POST', ... L110: }, L111: body: JSON.stringify({ channel, text: message }), L112: }); ... L135: } L136: const from = opts.from ?? process.env.TWILIO_FROM ?? ''; L137: if (!from) { ... L140: const url = 'https://api.twilio.com/2010-04-01/Accounts/' + sid + '/Messages.json'; L141: const auth = Buffer.from(sid + ':' + token).toString('base64'); L142: const body = new URLSearchParams({ To: to, From: from, Body: message }); ``` ### 15. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 16. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 17. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 18. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 19. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 20. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/agents/bridge.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 148 ``` ### 21. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/chat/board\_artifacts.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @nac3/forge-cli@1.2.4 matchedIdentity = npm:QG5hYzMvZm9yZ2UtY2xp:1.2.4 similarity = 0.992 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ### 22. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/codegen/e2e.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in dist/codegen/e2e.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 400 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 17 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 11 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 17 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.32.1 (Dependency) - @aws-sdk/client-ecs ^3.1053.0 (Dependency) - @noble/ciphers ^2.2.0 (Dependency) - @noble/hashes ^2.2.0 (Dependency) - @scure/base ^2.2.0 (Dependency) - better-sqlite3 ^12.10.0 (Dependency) - commander 12.1.0 (Dependency) - cross-spawn ^7.0.6 (Dependency) - dotenv ^17.4.2 (Dependency) - kleur 4.1.5 (Dependency) - mammoth ^1.8.0 (Dependency) - node-html-parser 6.1.13 (Dependency) - pdfjs-dist ^4.10.38 (Dependency) - prompts 2.4.2 (Dependency) - qrcode ^1.5.4 (Dependency) - typescript 5.7.2 (Dependency) - xlsx npm:@e965/xlsx@0.20.3 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @nac3/forge-cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.2.5 - **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE - **Version published:** 2026-09-07T21:07:08.851Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-04T22:39:02.862Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-30T19:14:12.237Z - **Known versions:** 41 - **Latest version:** 1.8.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Yujin Forge -- voice-first NAC-3 React development framework. CLI + chat panel + spec ingest + 10-format document reader + voice loop. - **Author:** Pablo Kuschnirof - **Maintainers:** yujin.app - **Keywords:** nac, nac-3, react, framework, claude-code, yujin, voice, whisper, elevenlabs, tts, stt, document-reader - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.17, pnpm: \>=9 - **Artifact files:** 2182 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 9,305,382 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()