--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli/v/3.23.1" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli/v/3.23.1.md" package: "@nalvietnam/avatar-cli" report_status: "published" title: "@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.23.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "3.23.1" --- # @nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.23.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 3.23.1 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. No credential exfiltration, stealthy persistence, or unconsented postinstall AI-control-surface mutation was found. Remote first-party AI-pack setup with permissive verification and a prepare Git-hook change merits a warning under the stated policy. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-22T06:55:34.198Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-22T06:56:31.159Z - **Download time:** 761 ms - **Static scan time:** 742 ms - **AI review time:** 55458 ms - **Total time:** 56961 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The package can configure Git hooks during \`prepare\` and, through explicit CLI setup commands, download a remote team AI pack into a project Claude directory. The install-time hook itself only displays a welcome screen; no concrete malicious chain is established. - **Trigger:** Local/VCS lifecycle \`prepare\`, or explicit \`avatar init\` / \`avatar sync\`. - **Impact:** A compromised or substituted remote pack could affect the configured project AI-harness surface; its documented digest check is non-blocking. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/postinstall.js, dist/index.js, README.md - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-22T06:56:31.159Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Remote AI-pack installation plus project-local Claude/Git configuration. - **Rationale:** No credential exfiltration, stealthy persistence, or unconsented postinstall AI-control-surface mutation was found. Remote first-party AI-pack setup with permissive verification and a prepare Git-hook change merits a warning under the stated policy. - **Files touched:** githooks, .claude/pack/, .claude/, CLAUDE.md, .git/hooks/ - **Network endpoints:** https://qpdbkewtpkkbcrptnlos.supabase.co/functions/v1/get-pack ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** \`prepare\` changes the invoking repository’s Git hooks path., \`avatar init\`/\`sync\` download and extract a remote AI pack; documented integrity verification is permissive., The CLI explicitly provisions project-local Claude/AI-harness artifacts. - **Evidence against:** \`postinstall\` only imports and prints a welcome screen, with CI/opt-out guards., No install-time network request, credential harvesting, or command execution is present in \`bin/postinstall.js\`., AI-project mutations occur through named CLI setup commands, not the postinstall hook. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.23.1. - Review the evidence and your use of @nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.23.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: `),plain:t=>process.stdout.write(`${t} L8: `)}});var Wt={};ut(Wt,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ve,computeFileSha256:()=>$r,copyDirRecursive:()=>Cr,downloadFile:()=>Tr,ensureDir:()=>v,extractTarballToDir:()=>Pr,pathExists:()=>g,readJso... L9: `,n)}async function Cr(t,e,n=[]){await v(e);let r=await j.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let i=cn(t,o.name),a=cn(e,o.name);if(o.isDire... ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: `),plain:t=>process.stdout.write(`${t} L8: `)}});var Wt={};ut(Wt,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ve,computeFileSha256:()=>$r,copyDirRecursive:()=>Cr,downloadFile:()=>Tr,ensureDir:()=>v,extractTarballToDir:()=>Pr,pathExists:()=>g,readJso... L9: `,n)}async function Cr(t,e,n=[]){await v(e);let r=await j.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let i=cn(t,o.name),a=cn(e,o.name);if(o.isDire... L10: `).filter(c=>c.trim().length>0)):r(new Error(`tar list exit ${l}: ${a.trim()}`))})});if(e.length>wi)throw new Error(`Tarball c\xF3 ${e.length} entries, v\u01B0\u1EE3t gi\u1EDBi h\u... ... L12: `),new Ce(Fr(a),`T\u1EA1o repo ${o} th\u1EA5t b\u1EA1i.`)}return s.success(`\u0110\xE3 t\u1EA1o: git@github.com:${o}.git`),`git@github.com:${o}.git`}var Ce,Br=R(()=>{"use strict";H... ``` ### 10. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: // @nalvietnam/avatar-cli — built with tsup L2: var Wl=Object.defineProperty;var R=(t,e)=>()=>(t&&(e=t(t=0)),e);var ut=(t,e)=>{for(var n in e)Wl(t,n,{get:e[n],enumerable:!0})};var ye,ui,rn,be=R(()=>{"use strict";ye=".claude/avat... L3: `),success:t=>process.stdout.write(`${f.green("\u2713")} ${t} ... L7: `),plain:t=>process.stdout.write(`${t} L8: `)}});var Wt={};ut(Wt,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ve,computeFileSha256:()=>$r,copyDirRecursive:()=>Cr,downloadFile:()=>Tr,ensureDir:()=>v,extractTarballToDir:()=>Pr,pathExists:()=>g,readJso... L9: `,n)}async function Cr(t,e,n=[]){await v(e);let r=await j.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let i=cn(t,o.name),a=cn(e,o.name);if(o.isDire... L10: `).filter(c=>c.trim().length>0)):r(new Error(`tar list exit ${l}: ${a. ``` ### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/avatar.js -> dist/index.js L1: // @nalvietnam/avatar-cli — built with tsup L2: var Wl=Object.defineProperty;var R=(t,e)=>()=>(t&&(e=t(t=0)),e);var ut=(t,e)=>{for(var n in e)Wl(t,n,{get:e[n],enumerable:!0})};var ye,ui,rn,be=R(()=>{"use strict";ye=".claude/avat... L3: `),success:t=>process.stdout.write(`${f.green("\u2713")} ${t} ... L7: `),plain:t=>process.stdout.write(`${t} L8: `)}});var Wt={};ut(Wt,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ve,computeFileSha256:()=>$r,copyDirRecursive:()=>Cr,downloadFile:()=>Tr,ensureDir:()=>v,extractTarballToDir:()=>Pr,pathExists:()=>g,readJso... L9: `,n)}async function Cr(t,e,n=[]){await v(e);let r=await j.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let i=cn(t,o.name),a=cn( ``` ### 12. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 13. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 15. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 14 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 7 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 14 ### Published dependency entries - @inquirer/prompts ^8.5.2 (Dependency) - @napi-rs/keyring ^1.1.0 (Dependency) - boxen ^8.0.0 (Dependency) - chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - cli-highlight ^2.1.11 (Dependency) - cli-table3 ^0.6.3 (Dependency) - clipboardy ^5.3.1 (Dependency) - commander ^15.0.0 (Dependency) - diff ^9.0.0 (Dependency) - fast-glob ^3.3.2 (Dependency) - open ^11.0.0 (Dependency) - ora ^9.4.0 (Dependency) - simple-git ^3.22.0 (Dependency) - zod ^4.4.3 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @nalvietnam/avatar-cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 3.23.1 - **Version published:** 2026-08-18T09:21:22.557Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T10:31:06.785Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-20T18:27:44.689Z - **Known versions:** 34 - **Latest version:** 3.41.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** AI harness CLI for NAL Vietnam engineering - **Maintainers:** namgaf, lukenals - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.17.0 - **Artifact files:** 38 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,407,827 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()