---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli/v/3.28.0"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli/v/3.28.0.md"
package: "@nalvietnam/avatar-cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "3.28.0"
---

# @nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 18 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 3.28.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The doctor command’s default probe forwards an existing session token to a configurable destination without a destination restriction, which warrants a warning for conditional credential exposure. The install hook itself only displays a welcome screen.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-07T22:34:21.622Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-07T22:35:16.444Z
- **Download time:** 772 ms
- **Static scan time:** 597 ms
- **AI review time:** 53452 ms
- **Total time:** 54822 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Running the doctor command can expose an existing session token to a configurable telemetry destination. The probe is enabled by default and has an explicit skip option.

- **Trigger:** A user runs the doctor command without disabling its probe.

- **Impact:** A configured destination outside the intended service could receive the session token.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/index.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-07T22:35:16.444Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The probe reads the package session token and POSTs it as a bearer credential to the configured telemetry URL, which defaults to the vendor telemetry host.

- **Rationale:** The doctor command’s default probe forwards an existing session token to a configurable destination without a destination restriction, which warrants a warning for conditional credential exposure. The install hook itself only displays a welcome screen.

- **Network endpoints:** https://telemetry.nal.vn/api/telemetry, AVATAR\_TELEMETRY\_URL

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 94.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The doctor command runs its telemetry probe by default; users must pass an option to skip it., The probe reads the existing package session token and accepts an environment-configured telemetry URL., It sends that token as a bearer credential to the selected URL without validating the destination in the probe code., The bundle’s indicated Claude configuration code only checks for package-specific files; this does not establish an agent-control attack.

- **Evidence against:** The npm postinstall hook only imports and displays a welcome screen, and skips that when CI or a skip variable is set.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0.

- Review the evidence and your use of @nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/dist/index.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: `),plain:t=>Ye(`${t}
L11: `)}});var he={};kt(he,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ze,computeFileSha256:()=>vo,copyDirRecursive:()=>wo,downloadFile:()=>yo,ensureDir:()=>S,extractTarballToDir:()=>bo,pathExists:()=>d,readJso...
L12: `,n)}async function wo(t,e,n=[]){await S(e);let r=await q.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let i=jn(t,o.name),s=jn(e,o.name);if(o.isDire...
```

### 6. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 7. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 8. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 9. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 10. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/dist/index.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L3: `)}function de(t,e){process.stderr.write(`${JSON.stringify({schema_version:1,command:t,error:e})}
L4: `)}var Wt=O(()=>{"use strict"});function C(){return na||process.env[Fm]==="1"}function Dm(t){na=t}function jm(t){ra=t}function K(t){if(!C())return;let e=ra[t];return e==null||e==="...
L5: `),1}function W(t,e){if(t==null||t==="")throw new $({missingFlag:e.flag,command:e.command,hint:e.hint});return t}function Um(t){return t.options.some(n=>n.long===ea)||t.option(ea,G...
...
L10: `),plain:t=>Ye(`${t}
L11: `)}});var he={};kt(he,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ze,computeFileSha256:()=>vo,copyDirRecursive:()=>wo,downloadFile:()=>yo,ensureDir:()=>S,extractTarballToDir:()=>bo,pathExists:()=>d,readJso...
L12: `,n)}async function wo(t,e,n=[]){await S(e);let r=await q.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o
```

### 11. Critical: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/dist/index.js>)

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: // @nalvietnam/avatar-cli — built with tsup
L2: var Mm=Object.defineProperty;var O=(t,e)=>()=>(t&&(e=t(t=0)),e);var kt=(t,e)=>{for(var n in e)Mm(t,n,{get:e[n],enumerable:!0})};function Ct(t){let e={schema_version:1,...t};e.schem...
L3: `)}function de(t,e){process.stderr.write(`${JSON.stringify({schema_version:1,command:t,error:e})}
...
L10: `),plain:t=>Ye(`${t}
L11: `)}});var he={};kt(he,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ze,computeFileSha256:()=>vo,copyDirRecursive:()=>wo,downloadFile:()=>yo,ensureDir:()=>S,extractTarballToDir:()=>bo,pathExists:()=>d,readJso...
L12: `,n)}async function wo(t,e,n=[]){await S(e);let r=await q.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let i=jn(t,o.name),s=jn(e,o.name);if(o.isDire...
L13: `).filter(c=>c.trim().length>0)):r(new Error(`tar
```

### 12. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/dist/index.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/avatar.js -> dist/index.js
L1: // @nalvietnam/avatar-cli — built with tsup
L2: var Mm=Object.defineProperty;var O=(t,e)=>()=>(t&&(e=t(t=0)),e);var kt=(t,e)=>{for(var n in e)Mm(t,n,{get:e[n],enumerable:!0})};function Ct(t){let e={schema_version:1,...t};e.schem...
L3: `)}function de(t,e){process.stderr.write(`${JSON.stringify({schema_version:1,command:t,error:e})}
...
L10: `),plain:t=>Ye(`${t}
L11: `)}});var he={};kt(he,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ze,computeFileSha256:()=>vo,copyDirRecursive:()=>wo,downloadFile:()=>yo,ensureDir:()=>S,extractTarballToDir:()=>bo,pathExists:()=>d,readJso...
L12: `,n)}async function wo(t,e,n=[]){await S(e);let r=await q.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let i=jn(t,o.name),s=jn(e,o.nam
```

### 13. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/dist/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/avatar.js -> dist/index.js
L1: // @nalvietnam/avatar-cli — built with tsup
L2: var Mm=Object.defineProperty;var O=(t,e)=>()=>(t&&(e=t(t=0)),e);var kt=(t,e)=>{for(var n in e)Mm(t,n,{get:e[n],enumerable:!0})};function Ct(t){let e={schema_version:1,...t};e.schem...
L3: `)}function de(t,e){process.stderr.write(`${JSON.stringify({schema_version:1,command:t,error:e})}
...
L10: `),plain:t=>Ye(`${t}
L11: `)}});var he={};kt(he,{atomicSwapDir:()=>ze,computeFileSha256:()=>vo,copyDirRecursive:()=>wo,downloadFile:()=>yo,ensureDir:()=>S,extractTarballToDir:()=>bo,pathExists:()=>d,readJso...
L12: `,n)}async function wo(t,e,n=[]){await S(e);let r=await q.readdir(t,{withFileTypes:!0});for(let o of r){if(n.includes(o.name))continue;let
```

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 18. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.28.0/dist/index.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @nalvietnam/avatar-cli@3.29.1
matchedIdentity = npm:QG5hbHZpZXRuYW0vYXZhdGFyLWNsaQ:3.29.1
similarity = 0.500
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 14
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 7
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 14

### Published dependency entries
- @inquirer/prompts ^8.5.2 (Dependency)
- @napi-rs/keyring ^1.1.0 (Dependency)
- boxen ^8.0.0 (Dependency)
- chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency)
- cli-highlight ^2.1.11 (Dependency)
- cli-table3 ^0.6.3 (Dependency)
- clipboardy ^5.3.1 (Dependency)
- commander ^15.0.0 (Dependency)
- diff ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- fast-glob ^3.3.2 (Dependency)
- open ^11.0.0 (Dependency)
- ora ^9.4.0 (Dependency)
- simple-git ^3.22.0 (Dependency)
- zod ^4.4.3 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @nalvietnam/avatar-cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 3.28.0
- **Version published:** 2026-08-25T02:46:58.992Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T10:31:06.785Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-20T18:27:44.689Z
- **Known versions:** 34
- **Latest version:** 3.41.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** AI harness CLI for NAL Vietnam engineering
- **Maintainers:** namgaf, lukenals
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.17.0
- **Artifact files:** 45
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,663,663 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nalvietnam/avatar-cli/v/3.28.0>)
