--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nemus-cli/nemus/v/0.17.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@nemus-cli/nemus/v/0.17.0.md" package: "@nemus-cli/nemus" report_status: "published" title: "@nemus-cli/nemus@0.17.0 npm security report" verdict: "policy_finding" version: "0.17.0" --- # @nemus-cli/nemus@0.17.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Package commands become automatically executable during subsequent Claude sessions across projects. - **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding - **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 0.17.0 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Global npm installation can automatically add executable hooks to Claude's global configuration without prior integration consent. The upgrade path can create new integration entries rather than merely refresh previously installed ones. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 97.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-02T22:40:43.586Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-02T22:42:48.657Z - **Download time:** 255 ms - **Static scan time:** 2388 ms - **AI review time:** 122427 ms - **Total time:** 125071 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Global npm installation can automatically add executable hooks to Claude's global configuration without prior integration consent. The upgrade path can create new integration entries rather than merely refresh previously installed ones. - **Trigger:** Global installation with a supported shell and an available Claude CLI, when setup falls through to the automatic upgrade. - **Impact:** Package commands become automatically executable during subsequent Claude sessions across projects. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, dist/mcp/install.js, dist/utils/permission-sync.js, dist/utils/agent-config.js, dist/utils/config.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-02T22:42:48.657Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Postinstall launches the upgrade command, which selects available agents and installs a command hook in global Claude settings without a previous-installation or consent gate. - **Attack narrative:** A global installation that skips interactive setup still reaches the automatic integration upgrade. Default agent detection selects installed CLIs. When Claude is active, the upgrade installs a new Stop command hook in the user's global settings, without requiring a previously installed integration or saved consent. This changes a foreign agent's automatic execution surface during npm postinstall. - **Rationale:** Source establishes unconsented npm postinstall mutation of a foreign global AI-agent control surface. The installation guards limit activation but do not provide consent for the automatic upgrade's new hooks. - **Files touched:** ~/.claude/settings.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for policy risk:** package.json activates scripts/postinstall.js automatically after installation., On global installs, postinstall runs the agent integration upgrade even when interactive configuration is skipped., The upgrade checks agent CLI availability, then installs hooks and skills without checking prior integration consent., For active Claude installations, the upgrade invokes permission hook installation., The installer adds a command hook to the user's global .claude/settings.json, including when no previous hook exists., Default configuration selects agents automatically from available CLIs and enables integration features. - **Evidence against:** Local, CI, and transient installations exit before setup., Interactive configuration offers an MCP installation choice, but the separate automatic upgrade path does not enforce that choice., The installed hook belongs to this package; inspected evidence does not establish credential theft. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @nemus-cli/nemus@0.17.0. - Avoid installing @nemus-cli/nemus@0.17.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** bin/workspace.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: L3: const path = require('path'); L4: const command = process.argv[2]; ``` ### 6. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** src/utils/bug-report.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L11: L12: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; L13: import * as os from 'os'; ... L22: */ L23: export const BUG_REPORT_REPO = process.env.NEMUS_BUG_REPORT_REPO || 'me-public/nemus'; L24: ... L58: L59: const home = os.homedir(); L60: if (home) { ... L132: try { L133: const raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(LAST_ERROR_FILE, 'utf-8')); L134: // Validate required fields so a malformed/old file can't crash the reporter. ``` ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** src/postinstall.test.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L1: import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'; L2: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L3: import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; ... L7: L8: const SCRIPT = join(__dirname, '..', 'scripts', 'postinstall.js'); L9: // postinstall.js guards its side effects with `require.main !== module`, so ... L25: it('npm -g → global-npm; npm local → local', () => { L26: expect(classifyInstall({ env: { npm[redacted]: 'true', npm[redacted]: NPM_UA }, dirname: '/usr/local/lib/node_modules/@nemus-cli/nemus/scripts', tmpDir: TMP })).toBe('g... L27: expect(classifyInstall({ env: { npm[redacted]: 'false', npm[redacted]: NPM_UA }, dirname: '/proj/node_modules/@nemus-cli/nemus/scripts', tmpDir: TMP })).toBe('local'); ... L67: // The real macOS case: os.tmpdir() reports /var/folders/… (a s ``` ### 9. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 11. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 12. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** uninstall.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = uninstall.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 5610 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 14. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/ai-prompt.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 10 ``` ### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/branch-operations.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.3.3 matchedPath = dist/utils/branch-operations.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/claude-integration.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.3.3 matchedPath = dist/utils/claude-integration.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/ghq-integration.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.3.3 matchedPath = dist/utils/ghq-integration.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/health-checks.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.3.3 matchedPath = dist/utils/health-checks.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/version-check.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.15.2 matchedPath = dist/utils/version-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.15.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.15.2 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.15.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/configure.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.15.2 matchedPath = dist/commands/configure.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.15.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.3.3 matchedPath = dist/mcp/install.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/bug-report.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.3.3 matchedPath = dist/utils/bug-report.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/config.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.15.2 matchedPath = dist/utils/config.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.15.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/editor.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.15.2 matchedPath = dist/utils/editor.js matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.15.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/postinstall.test.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @nemus-cli/nemus@0.15.2 matchedPath = src/postinstall.test.ts matchedIdentity = npm:QG5lbXVzLWNsaS9uZW11cw:0.15.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 9 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 6 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 9 ### Published dependency entries - @inquirer/prompts ^8.7.0 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.26.0 (Dependency) - cli-progress ^3.12.0 (Dependency) - commander ^15.0.0 (Dependency) - fuzzy ^0.1.3 (Dependency) - ink ^7.1.1 (Dependency) - markdown-table ^3.0.3 (Dependency) - react ^19.2.8 (Dependency) - zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @nemus-cli/nemus - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.17.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-16T10:55:09.909Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-27T14:41:37.652Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-02T22:43:26.271Z - **Known versions:** 15 - **Latest version:** 0.17.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Nemus — a CLI for managing multi-repository workspaces. Create, sync, and operate across dozens of repos with a single command, and wire them up to your favorite coding agent. - **Author:** Nemus contributors - **Keywords:** workspace, git, github, cli, monorepo, multi-repo, polyrepo, developer-tools, ai-agents, claude, codex - **Runtime engines:** npm: \>=9.0.0, node: \>=22.13.0 - **Artifact files:** 390 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,448,713 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()