registry / @netnodeag/kraftwerk / 0.15.0
@netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.15.0
Deterministic workflow-as-code framework: agents (persona + model + tools + harness) run in bounded phases on headless CLI harnesses (claude -p, codex exec, pi); code owns the control flow, envelopes + gates judge the results
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a workflow-orchestration package with powerful but user-invoked execution paths. It has no registry-install lifecycle trigger, self-dependency, credential exfiltration, or concealed payload behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user starts a workflow, uses the inspector, selects a remote source, or enables the sandbox SSH option.
Impact
Configured workflows can run external agent tools with the permissions the user explicitly grants.
Mechanism
User-invoked workflow orchestration and optional Docker execution.
AI rationale
This is a workflow-orchestration package with powerful but user-invoked execution paths. It has no registry-install lifecycle trigger, self-dependency, credential exfiltration, or concealed payload behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The inspector can launch an explicit workflow run through npx.
- The optional Docker runner passes selected API keys and, only with the SSH option, an SSH agent socket into a container.
- Routine-triggered team chats automatically select an available permission option.
- Remote workflow support clones a user-supplied Git repository into a cache.
Evidence against
- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its only lifecycle hook is prepublishOnly.
- The risky operations are reached through explicit CLI, UI, sandbox, remote-source, or routine workflow actions.
- The registry request is limited to the doctor command's package-version check.
- No code inspected harvests credentials or sends local data to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/remote.jsView file
1import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
High
bin/kraftwerk.jsView file
15if (existsSync(src) && process.env.KRAFTWERK_DIST !== "1") {
L16: const { register } = await import("tsx/esm/api");
L17: register();
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/kraftwerk.jsView on unpkg · L15dist/inspector/runner.jsView file
1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdirSync, openSync, closeSync } from "node:fs";
...
L8: * Workflow trigger for the web UI. The inspector stays decoupled from the
L9: * framework runtime: it shells out to `npx kraftwerk run` in the consumer
L10: * project, detached, with a pre-chosen --run-id so the browser can jump to
Findings
1 Critical4 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/runner/docker.js
HighChild Processdist/remote.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installdist/inspector/runner.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/inspector/chat/sessions.js
MediumDynamic Requirebin/kraftwerk.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.15.0.
See all versions of @netnodeag/kraftwerk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.15.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.