@netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.16.0
Deterministic workflow-as-code framework: agents (persona + model + tools + harness) run in bounded phases on headless CLI harnesses (claude -p, codex exec, pi); code owns the control flow, envelopes + gates judge the results
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package contains a real unattended agent-permission capability, so it warrants a warning as a dangerous automation tool. It has no registry-install hook or concrete malicious payload behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user starts a workflow or configures and triggers a team routine.
Impact
An agent or workflow with granted local tool access could modify project data or use credentials made available to it.
Mechanism
Unattended agent permission approval and user-configured command execution.
AI rationale
The package contains a real unattended agent-permission capability, so it warrants a warning as a dangerous automation tool. It has no registry-install hook or concrete malicious payload behavior.
Evidence
dist/inspector/chat/sessions.jsdist/run.jsdist/runner/docker.jsrunner.envoutput/runs/<id>/runner.jsonoutput/runs/<id>/runner.log
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Scheduled team routines automatically approve an available agent permission option.
- User-selected workflow script phases execute their configured Bash text.
- Sandbox runs can pass API credentials and, when requested, an SSH agent into a container.
Evidence against
- There is no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; the only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly.
- The risky operations are part of an agent-workflow CLI and require a user command or configured routine.
- No source evidence shows secret collection, covert exfiltration, self-dependency, or foreign agent-config mutation.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/remote.jsView file
1import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
High
bin/kraftwerk.jsView file
15if (existsSync(src) && process.env.KRAFTWERK_DIST !== "1") {
L16: const { register } = await import("tsx/esm/api");
L17: register();
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/kraftwerk.jsView on unpkg · L15dist/inspector/runner.jsView file
1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdirSync, openSync, closeSync } from "node:fs";
...
L8: * Workflow trigger for the web UI. The inspector stays decoupled from the
L9: * framework runtime: it shells out to `npx kraftwerk run` in the consumer
L10: * project, detached, with a pre-chosen --run-id so the browser can jump to
Findings
1 Critical4 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/runner/docker.js
HighChild Processdist/remote.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installdist/inspector/runner.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/inspector/chat/sessions.js
MediumDynamic Requirebin/kraftwerk.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.16.0.
See all versions of @netnodeag/kraftwerk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.16.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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