@netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.18.0
Deterministic workflow-as-code framework: agents (persona + model + tools + harness) run in bounded phases on headless CLI harnesses (claude -p, codex exec, pi); code owns the control flow, envelopes + gates judge the results
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package exposes powerful, user-configured agent and credential-forwarding behavior. It is not a concrete malicious install chain, but the dual-use capability warrants a warning.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user runs a Kraftwerk workflow or enables its sandbox and SSH options.
Impact
A malicious or untrusted workflow could cause approved agent tools or configured MCP servers to modify the workspace or use exposed credentials.
Mechanism
Workflow-driven agent execution with MCP, shell, and optional credential forwarding.
AI rationale
The package exposes powerful, user-configured agent and credential-forwarding behavior. It is not a concrete malicious install chain, but the dual-use capability warrants a warning.
Evidence
dist/harnesses/codex.jsschema/workflow.schema.jsondist/runner/docker.jsoutput/runs/<run-id>
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The Codex harness grants automatic approval when a workflow configures MCP servers.
- The workflow schema accepts executable MCP server commands and their environment values.
- The optional Docker mode forwards API keys and, when requested, the SSH agent into an agent workflow.
Evidence against
- The manifest has only a prepublish-only script, not an install lifecycle hook.
- These capabilities activate through explicit workflow or CLI use, not package import.
- No fixed exfiltration endpoint, self-dependency, or stealth persistence was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/remote.jsView file
1import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
High
bin/kraftwerk.jsView file
15if (existsSync(src) && process.env.KRAFTWERK_DIST !== "1") {
L16: const { register } = await import("tsx/esm/api");
L17: register();
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/kraftwerk.jsView on unpkg · L15dist/inspector/runner.jsView file
1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdirSync, openSync, closeSync } from "node:fs";
...
L8: * Workflow trigger for the web UI. The inspector stays decoupled from the
L9: * framework runtime: it shells out to `npx kraftwerk run` in the consumer
L10: * project, detached, with a pre-chosen --run-id so the browser can jump to
Findings
1 Critical4 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/runner/docker.js
HighChild Processdist/remote.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installdist/inspector/runner.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/inspector/chat/sessions.js
MediumDynamic Requirebin/kraftwerk.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.18.0.
See all versions of @netnodeag/kraftwerk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.18.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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