registry / @netnodeag/kraftwerk / 0.8.1
@netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.8.1
Deterministic workflow-as-code framework: agents (persona + model + tools + harness) run in bounded phases on headless CLI harnesses (claude -p, codex exec, pi); code owns the control flow, envelopes + gates judge the results
AI Security Review
scanned 17d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install-time attack behavior: the only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly and runs build tasks. The flagged Git, process, chat, and Docker behavior is tied to workflow operations and does not establish malicious conduct.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A caller requests remote workflow resolution, posts a chat message, or starts an inspector or sandbox workflow run.
Impact
These operations support the requested workflow and do not establish an attack surface.
Mechanism
The package clones caller-supplied Git repositories and invokes agent or Docker processes for workflow runs.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no install-time attack behavior: the only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly and runs build tasks. The flagged Git, process, chat, and Docker behavior is tied to workflow operations and does not establish malicious conduct.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json defines prepublishOnly as build tasks; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- resolveRemote performs Git clone/fetch operations on the supplied repository spec and stores them in the Kraftwerk cache.
- Inspector workflow execution is initiated through triggerRun(opts), which builds arguments from the requested workflow and options.
- Chat processing begins in postMessage(id, text) after loading a chat and checking its state.
- Sandbox workflow execution is an explicit runSandboxed(opts) operation that checks Docker availability.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/remote.jsView file
1import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
High
bin/kraftwerk.jsView file
15if (existsSync(src) && process.env.KRAFTWERK_DIST !== "1") {
L16: const { register } = await import("tsx/esm/api");
L17: register();
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/kraftwerk.jsView on unpkg · L15dist/inspector/runner.jsView file
1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdirSync, openSync, closeSync } from "node:fs";
...
L8: * Workflow trigger for the web UI. The inspector stays decoupled from the
L9: * framework runtime: it shells out to `npx kraftwerk run` in the consumer
L10: * project, detached, with a pre-chosen --run-id so the browser can jump to
Findings
1 Critical3 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/runner/docker.js
HighChild Processdist/remote.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/inspector/runner.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/inspector/chat/sessions.js
MediumDynamic Requirebin/kraftwerk.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.8.1.
See all versions of @netnodeag/kraftwerk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @netnodeag/kraftwerk@0.8.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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