The server exposes an agent endpoint on every network interface and defaults to approving tool actions in headless mode, without an authentication check evident on the message route. This creates a meaningful remote control risk when the port is reachable, but the source does not establish malicious intent.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user starts the server in a non-TTY environment, including through the daemon launcher.
Impact
Network clients able to reach the port may submit agent tasks that use the server's available tools against the configured project.
Mechanism
The server listens on all interfaces; non-TTY startup enables auto-approval by default, and /v1/messages forwards caller input to the orchestrator.
Evidence
bin/cortex-daemon.jsdist/index.jsdist/routes/messages.jsdist/middleware/cors.jslogs/nexus-cortex-<timestamp>.loglogs/nexus-cortex-<timestamp>.error.logproject files accessible to Cortex tools