@ngockhoale/ukit@2.1.3
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, Antigravity, OpenAI Codex, and OpenCode.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete exfiltration, remote payload execution, or unconsented npm lifecycle mutation was found. The explicit installer nevertheless creates and expands AI-agent permissions, so it warrants a warning under the agent-config mutation policy.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Explicit `ukit install` deploys Codex agent links and settings.
- Claude template sets `bypassPermissions` and activates command hooks.
- A Bash hook adds encountered command binaries to Claude allow rules.
- Install adds local Git hooks that run the deployed index refresher.
- package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hook.
- Mutations require the user-invoked CLI install path; no credential harvesting or runtime network egress was found.
- Git hook payload is a local Node index refresh, not a remote payload loader.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.1.3.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.1.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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