@ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.4
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not malicious source code, but it is an explicit installer for an AI-agent control surface with broad permissions and automatic hooks. Per policy, this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The explicit CLI install command writes a project Claude configuration and many hook scripts.
- The installed Claude configuration enables permission bypass and runs hooks for prompts and tool use.
- The manifest marks the agent configuration and hooks as enabled by default.
- The vision hook only invokes local project scripts; its source states that it does not download images.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- No source evidence of credential harvesting, secret exfiltration, remote payload retrieval, or obfuscated execution was found.
- The package is an explicit user-invoked workspace and agent-extension installer, not an install-time mutator.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.4.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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