@ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.8
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not malicious based on the reviewed source, but its explicit setup command installs a project-local agent extension that can broaden Bash permissions. This warrants a warning for dangerous capability rather than a publication block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The explicit install command deploys Claude configuration and executable hooks into a project.
- The deployed Claude configuration enables permission bypass mode.
- A Bash pre-tool hook automatically adds allow rules for eligible command binaries.
- The hook excludes interpreters and several destructive commands, but can still broaden allowed Bash commands.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or other lifecycle hook.
- The agent configuration is installed only through the user-invoked ukit install command.
- No source evidence shows credential exfiltration, remote payload retrieval, or hidden network activity.
- Image handling is local and states it has no network calls.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.8.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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