@ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.9
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not malicious by source evidence, but it performs broad project-local AI-agent extension setup with permissive settings and hooks. Warn so users review the installed workspace configuration before use.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The explicit CLI install command writes a large set of AI workspace assets into the current project.
- The manifest deploys Claude settings, hooks, agents, and Codex and OMP adapter files.
- The shipped Claude settings set the default mode to bypass permissions and register command hooks.
- An explicit install also adds managed Git hooks that run the local index refresh script.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The command entry point uses the current working directory only when the user runs the CLI.
- No source network client, credential harvesting, or data exfiltration path was found.
- The reviewed vision hook only processes prompt references locally and states that it does not download image URLs.
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/vision-router.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.9.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.2.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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