@ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.12
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not malicious by the available static evidence, but its explicit installer changes AI-agent permissions and installs event hooks in the consumer project. Downgrade to a warning so users can review the permission bypass before use.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI defaults to its install command when the user runs it without a command.
- The install manifest overwrites the project's Claude settings, which set the agent to bypass permission prompts.
- Installed hooks process Claude tool and prompt events, including local prompt and image-reference handling.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or self-dependency.
- No source evidence of network requests, credential exfiltration, remote payload loading, or destructive install-time execution was found.
- The sensitive-data hook is designed to block secret material from reaching the AI.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/sensitive-data-guard.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/sensitive-data-guard.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.12.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.12 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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