@ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.14
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install lifecycle hook or confirmed theft, remote payload, or destructive behavior. Its explicit CLI installation nevertheless modifies AI-agent permissions and hooks, so it warrants a warning for dangerous agent capability configuration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI treats a user invocation without a command as an install operation.
- The manifest installs Claude settings and hooks by default, with overwrite-with-backup behavior.
- The installed Claude settings set permission bypass mode and register command hooks for tool events.
- A prompt hook reads hook input and launches local Node code.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle script.
- The sensitive-data hook blocks detected secret exposure and emits redacted notices.
- No package-controlled network endpoint or credential exfiltration path was found in the inspected sources.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/sensitive-data-guard.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/sensitive-data-guard.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.14.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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