@ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.20
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo automatic lifecycle hook, self-dependency, remote payload, or data exfiltration was found. The explicit installer nevertheless modifies AI-agent control surfaces and dynamically broadens command permissions.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI defaults to its install command and deploys project-level AI workspace assets.
- The manifest overwrites Claude settings and installs executable hooks in the consumer project.
- A deployed hook dynamically adds wildcard Bash permission rules to the project's local Claude settings.
- The default install also creates Codex links and writes Codex settings.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle script.
- No source-inspected network exfiltration or remote payload download was found.
- The permission hook excludes shell interpreters and several destructive command names.
- The configuration changes require an explicit CLI invocation rather than npm installation.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.20.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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