registry / @ngockhoale/ukit / 2.3.21
@ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.21
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo automatic npm lifecycle attack, self-dependency chain, exfiltration, or fixed remote payload path was found. However, the explicit installer changes a project AI-agent control surface to bypass permission prompts and deploys executable hooks.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
The user invokes the ukit CLI install command or runs the binary with no command.
Impact
Claude Code sessions in that project can run with reduced permission prompting and invoke installed hook code.
Mechanism
Project-level Claude configuration and hook deployment.
AI rationale
No automatic npm lifecycle attack, self-dependency chain, exfiltration, or fixed remote payload path was found. However, the explicit installer changes a project AI-agent control surface to bypass permission prompts and deploys executable hooks.
Evidence
manifests/platform.full.yamltemplates/.claude/settings.jsontemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh.claude/settings.json.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh.claude/ukit/runtime/task-watchdog.mjs
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The explicit CLI install writes a Claude settings template into the consumer project.
- That template sets Claude Code to bypass permission prompts and registers package-supplied hooks that run from the project.
- The task-watchdog hook dynamically imports a runtime module from the installed project directory.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- There is no runtime dependency on this package itself.
- No credential exfiltration, fixed network endpoint, or hidden payload execution was confirmed.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemShell
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcetemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView file
•path = templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
kind = payload_in_excluded_dir
sizeBytes = 8598
magicHex = [redacted]
High
Payload In Excluded Dir
Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkg•path = templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 8598
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkg73const runtimePath = path.join(projectRoot, '.claude', 'ukit', 'runtime', 'task-watchdog.mjs');
// Async existence check — sync fs here would violate the all-async invariant
// (a stalled mount would block the loop and the 3s self-kill could not fire).
try {
await fsp.access(runtimePath);
} catch {
process.exit(0);
}
let runtime;
try {
runtime = await import(pathToFileURL(runtimePath).href);
} catch {
Medium
Ai Review Evidence
Findings
2 High5 Medium3 Low
HighPayload In Excluded Dirtemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedpackage.json
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helpertemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumAi Review Evidencetemplates/.claude/settings.json
MediumAi Review Evidencetemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.21.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.21 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.