@ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.24
Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, OpenCode, and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not malicious install-hook abuse because there is no npm lifecycle trigger or observed exfiltration. It remains a real agent-control-surface capability because an explicit CLI run can mutate project and user-level Claude hook settings.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs ukit or ukit install in a project.
Impact
Can alter Claude Code tool-call behavior and remove registrations that match its repair heuristic.
Mechanism
AI-agent settings and hook installation with hook-registration repair.
AI rationale
This is not malicious install-hook abuse because there is no npm lifecycle trigger or observed exfiltration. It remains a real agent-control-surface capability because an explicit CLI run can mutate project and user-level Claude hook settings.
Evidence
src/cli/index.jssrc/core/runInstallPipeline.jssrc/core/repairBrokenHooks.jstemplates/.claude/settings.json.claude/settings.json.claude/settings.local.json$HOME/.claude/settings.json.claude/hooks/sensitive-data-guard.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI defaults to an install command when invoked without a command.
- The install pipeline writes a managed plan and invokes hook repair.
- Hook repair rewrites both project and user-level Claude settings files.
- The installed template registers a command hook that can block AI tool use.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle script.
- No network endpoint, credential exfiltration, or remote payload execution was found.
- The hook code is local and designed to detect and block sensitive-data exposure.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemShell
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcetemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView file
•path = templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
kind = payload_in_excluded_dir
sizeBytes = 8598
magicHex = [redacted]
High
Payload In Excluded Dir
Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkg•path = templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 8598
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
templates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkgpackage.jsonView file
•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
High
Semantic Analysis Limited
Findings
2 High7 Medium3 Low
HighPayload In Excluded Dirtemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedpackage.json
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helpertemplates/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumAi Review Evidencesrc/cli/index.js
MediumAi Review Evidencesrc/core/runInstallPipeline.js
MediumAi Review Evidencesrc/core/repairBrokenHooks.js
MediumAi Review Evidencetemplates/.claude/settings.json
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.24.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@2.3.24 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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