@ngockhoale/ukit@3.1.0
⚠ Under reviewInstall/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex and omp (Oh My Pi).
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source shows a CLI-driven workspace installer and project hook configuration, with no concrete malicious behavior established. A clean verdict requires citations for eleven requested paths, exceeding the eight-citation limit; no independent source behavior supports a warning or block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a CLI and contains no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The Claude hook reads its event name and project root from its invocation context.
- The template registers package-owned commands for Claude edit and write events.
- The CLI routes the explicit install command to the package installer.
- The inspected hook is part of an explicit CLI setup flow; no source inspected here establishes an unconsented install-time mutation or a concrete attack.
- The surfaced hook behavior is consistent with a workspace tool that runs Claude project hooks.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
scripts/bench/runGold.mjsView on unpkg · L121Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
src/core/memory/learningCandidates.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@3.1.0.
See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@3.1.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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