registry / @ngockhoale/ukit / 3.4.29

@ngockhoale/ukit@3.4.29

Install/update an index-first AI workspace for Claude Code, OpenAI Codex and omp (Oh My Pi).

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Inspected the manifest, required source locations, and relevant decision-client and watchdog code. The flagged locations are consistent with CLI maintenance and diagnostics, and no concrete malicious behavior was established.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

A user runs the CLI or invokes a workspace helper.

Impact

No malicious impact was established from the inspected source.

Mechanism

The inspected code performs bounded project setup, settings repair, snapshotting, diagnostics, and decision-service requests; no concrete attack chain was established.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 78.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json defines a CLI entry and no install lifecycle hook; its dependency list contains no runtime self-dependency.
The inspected agent-related helpers concern project setup, snapshots, and repair of malformed hook registrations; their inspected code does not establish covert control-surface mutation.
The shipped watchdog is a bounded hook that stages input and delegates stop decisions to the coordinator; no attack behavior was identified in the inspected source.
The benchmark, performance audit, and capability probe are measurement tools whose inspected locations describe fixture, telemetry, and workspace inspection behavior.
The decision client is described as using gateway configuration and credentials for its decision request; no evidence in the inspected source establishes credential forwarding to an unrelated recipient.
The decision-coverage file is an audit utility; the inspected opening identifies it as a CI coverage guard.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequire

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

scripts/bench/runGold.mjsView file

Lines 101-141javascript

101 failures.push(`budget: used ${packet.budget.used} > maxTokens ${maxTokens}`);

102 }

103

104 return {

105 id: testCase.id ?? '(unnamed)',

106 mode: packet.task_type,

107 expectedMode,

108 anchors: [...anchorPaths],

109 expectedAnchors,

110 anchorHits,

111 anchorMisses,

112 budgetUsed: packet.budget?.used ?? 0,

113 maxTokens,

114 routedMode: routed.mode,

115 pass: failures.length === 0,

116 failures,

117 };

118}

119

120export async function runGold({ projectRoot, corpusPath } = {}) {

121 const rootDir = projectRoot ?? REPO_ROOT;

122 const { compileContext } = await import(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'src/core/codeintel/compiler.js'));

123 const { routeTask } = await import(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'src/core/codeintel/router.js'));

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/bench/runGold.mjsView on unpkg · L121

124 const { buildCodeIndex } = await import(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'src/index/buildIndex.js'));

125 const { INDEX_ARTIFACTS, getArtifactPath } = await import(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'src/index/paths.js'));

126

127 // The bench needs an index to score anchors; build once when missing.

128 try {

129 await fs.stat(getArtifactPath(rootDir, INDEX_ARTIFACTS.files));

130 } catch {

131 console.log('[bench] index missing — building code index first');

132 await buildCodeIndex({ rootDir });

133 }

134

135 const cases = await loadCorpus(corpusPath ?? DEFAULT_CORPUS);

136 const results = [];

137 for (const testCase of cases) {

138 results.push(await runGoldCase(rootDir, testCase, { compileContext, routeTask }));

139 }

140 return { results, pass: results.every((r) => r.pass) };

141}

scripts/release/verify-release.mjsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';

2import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';

3import crypto from 'node:crypto';

4import os from 'node:os'

template_project/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView file

•path = template_project/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 11622 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

template_project/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkg

•path = template_project/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 11622 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

template_project/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.shView on unpkg

scripts/audit/decision-coverage.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 11

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/audit/decision-coverage.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

package.jsonView file

Lines 31-71json

31 "src/",

32 "scripts/",

33 "!scripts/audit/c100/attribution-gap.mjs",

34 "!scripts/audit/c100/implementer-attribution.mjs",

35 "!scripts/audit/c100/trees-lifetimes.mjs",

36 "!scripts/audit/c100/usage-provenance.mjs",

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

scripts/bench/runGold.mjsView file

121const rootDir = projectRoot ?? REPO_ROOT; L122: const { compileContext } = await import(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'src/core/codeintel/compiler.js')); L123: const { routeTask } = await import(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'src/core/codeintel/router.js'));

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/bench/runGold.mjsView on unpkg · L121

scripts/release/verify-release.mjsView file

1import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L2: import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L6: L7: const rootDir = process.cwd(); L8: const npmCacheDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'ukit-npm-cache'); ... L14: // UKIT_VERIFY_STEP_TIMEOUT_MS overrides the step budget for tests. L15: const STEP_TIMEOUT_MS = Number(process.env.UKIT_VERIFY_STEP_TIMEOUT_MS) || 10 * 60 * 1000; // 10 min L16: const REGISTRY_TIMEOUT_MS = Number(process.env.UKIT_VERIFY_REGISTRY_TIMEOUT_MS) || 60 * 1000; // 1 min ... L18: // Opt-in post-publish registry-parity check (Release Policy invariant: npm and git always hold L19: // the same latest version). Only meaningful AFTER `npm publish` — before publish the registry is L20: // behind by definition — so it is gated behind --post-

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Findings

2 High4 Medium6 Low

HighPayload In Excluded Dirtemplate_project/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedscripts/audit/decision-coverage.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumDynamic Requirescripts/bench/runGold.mjs

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helpertemplate_project/.claude/hooks/task-watchdog.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowWeak Cryptoscripts/release/verify-release.mjs

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @ngockhoale/ukit@3.4.29.

See all versions of @ngockhoale/ukit for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @ngockhoale/ukit@3.4.29 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 13:24:45.627Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.