@nocobase/cli-v1@2.2.14
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AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe transfer is user-invoked and uses an aligned default destination, so the source does not establish a hidden attack. Because an override can direct existing credentials to an unrestricted endpoint, this remains a conditional credential exposure risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The user-invoked `pkg download-pro` command defaults to NocoBase’s package host but accepts an environment override for the destination.
- The command obtains a saved license access-key pair and uses it when available; otherwise, it can use package credentials supplied through environment variables.
- When credentials are present, the command sends them in a login request to the configured package URL.
- The transfer requires explicitly running `pkg download-pro`, and its default destination is the package registry host.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
src/commands/e2e.jsView on unpkg · L11Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
src/commands/e2e.jsView on unpkg · L123Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @nocobase/cli-v1@2.2.14.
See all versions of @nocobase/cli-v1 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @nocobase/cli-v1@2.2.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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