@nocobase/cli-v1@2.2.8
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AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe default authentication flow targets the package service, but an unrestricted URL override can redirect saved credentials. This supports a warning for conditional credential exposure, not a finding of malicious default behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `src/license.js` reads and decrypts a saved license key, then returns its access key ID and secret.
- `src/commands/pkg.js` passes those credentials to a login request at a URL built from `NOCOBASE_PKG_URL`, which has no destination validation in the inspected path.
- The transfer runs through the explicit `pkg download-pro` command; its default destination is `https://pkg.nocobase.com/`, and `DISABLE_PKG_DOWNLOAD=true` stops it.
- The default destination is the package service, and the transfer requires the user to invoke the download command.
- The source does not establish that credentials are sent to an unrelated recipient by default.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
src/commands/e2e.jsView on unpkg · L11Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
src/commands/e2e.jsView on unpkg · L123Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @nocobase/cli-v1@2.2.8.
See all versions of @nocobase/cli-v1 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @nocobase/cli-v1@2.2.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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