@nsub/nitxe@1.0.0

The package's declared npm postinstall script collects the installer's username (os.userInfo().username), hostname (os.hostname()), platform, and the entire process.env object, base64-encodes the JSON, and transmits it as a query parameter in an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded unrelated host (gjsidn.co/collect?d=...). This fires automatically on `npm install`. The call is dispatched via `eval('play(food())')` wrapped in a silent try/catch — an obfuscation pattern with no legitimate purpose. In this specific version the postinstall.js file requires only `https` and never requires `os`, so the eval'd call throws a ReferenceError that the try/catch swallows and no network I/O actually occurs — but the code shape is unambiguous credential/environment theft and a one-line follow-up publish would make it live. Installer harm surface: full process.env dump on CI machines commonly exports cloud credentials, CI secrets, and npm publish tokens. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d3269e39ebe4ffb139eba279503d64bceb158c5a822b2238c92dc463c10aedba) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.