@okostream/mcp@0.12.12
Control OKO Stream webinars from Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install-time execution, covert exfiltration, persistence, or reviewer manipulation. Network and local-file capabilities are explicit, scoped, and aligned with the MCP service function.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The runtime sends a configured OKO API key to its declared OKO authentication endpoint.
- It can read local image files only from explicit user-configured allowlisted directories.
- The manifest configures its prepublishOnly lifecycle script to run the build command.
- The manifest has no install lifecycle hook; prepublishOnly is publish-time only.
- The entrypoint is an MCP server over standard input/output, not an install-time payload.
- Authentication, scoped permissions, and confirmation checks gate account-changing tools.
- The reported dynamic code generation is bundled validator-library code, not package-controlled payload execution.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L1232A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/server.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.12.12.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.12.12 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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