@okostream/mcp@0.12.13
Control OKO Stream webinars from Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiDirect inspection found no install-time execution, persistence, shell execution, broad file harvesting, or unconsented agent-control mutation. The browser-related static signal comes from bundled Firebase code, while package-specific operations are an authenticated MCP service with explicit safeguards.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has only a publish-time hook and no install lifecycle hook.
- The executable starts an MCP stdio server and exchanges a configured OKO API key with the package service.
- Local image reading is disabled by default and restricted to configured trusted roots.
- The server loads the user's home .env file at runtime.
- Configured API credentials are sent to the OKO authentication endpoint when the MCP server connects.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L1232A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/server.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.12.13.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.12.13 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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