@okostream/mcp@0.12.14
Control OKO Stream webinars from Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found a bundled OKO Stream MCP server, not install-time malware. Its network and file-access behavior is configuration- or user-invoked and bounded by authentication, confirmation checks, and image-path/network validation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has only a prepublish lifecycle hook; installation has no automatic lifecycle command.
- At runtime, a configured OKO API key is sent to the fixed vendor authentication endpoint.
- Local image reading is opt-in and restricted to configured non-root directories.
- No install, postinstall, or preinstall hook is present.
- No child-process execution, persistence, agent configuration mutation, or self-dependency was found.
- The large bundled file implements an authenticated MCP server over stdio; destructive tools require explicit confirmation and scoped authentication.
- Remote image retrieval rejects local/private destinations and embedded URL credentials.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L1232A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/server.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.12.14.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.12.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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