@okostream/mcp@0.13.2
Control OKO Stream webinars from Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found a package-aligned MCP server with no automatic install lifecycle behavior. Its network authentication and optional file input are explicit runtime features with scoped and allowlisted controls.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a stdio CLI entry point and has no consumer install hook.
- At runtime, the server sends the supplied OKO API key to its configured authentication endpoint.
- Local image reads require an explicit allowlist and reject paths outside it.
- No preinstall, install, or postinstall script exists; prepublishOnly is publish-time only.
- The bundle starts an MCP server over stdio rather than executing shell commands or installing other packages.
- Authentication and Firebase access are consistent with the webinar-management MCP purpose.
- No source evidence of secret harvesting beyond the configured API key, local persistence, or covert exfiltration was found.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L1232A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/server.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.13.2.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.13.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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