@okostream/mcp@0.14.0
Control OKO Stream webinars from Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe code presents a conditional credential-forwarding capability to an unrestricted configured endpoint. This is a concrete non-install-time risk, but the inspected source does not establish covert theft or a malicious lifecycle chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The executable server reads OKO_API_KEY and selects its exchange URL from the unrestricted OKO_EXCHANGE_URL environment variable.
- When authentication runs, it posts the API key to that selected URL.
- The package has no install lifecycle hook; its entrypoint is the user-invoked MCP server binary.
- The built-in exchange endpoint is an OKO Cloud Functions URL.
- The inspected entrypoint connects through MCP stdio and no package-authored shell execution or agent-config writes were found.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L1232A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/server.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.14.0.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.14.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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