@okostream/mcp@0.18.1
Control OKO Stream webinars from Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected entrypoint behavior matches an authenticated webinar MCP client with guarded file access and destructive operations. No concrete malicious chain was established; configurable authentication uses caller-supplied API credentials rather than harvested sessions.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json routes both CLI commands to dist/server.js and defines no registry install hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- dist/server.js registers webinar tools and connects an MCP stdio transport.
- Authentication sends the explicitly configured OKO_API_KEY to the configured authentication endpoint, defaulting to OKO's service.
- Local image reads require configured trusted roots and enforce resolved path containment.
- Workspace member removal checks authentication, ownership, and explicit confirmation.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L1232A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/server.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.18.1.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.18.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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