@okostream/mcp@0.19.0
Control OKO Stream webinars from Claude, Codex, and other MCP clients.
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe authentication flow sends the organizer API key to an operator-configurable endpoint without an established destination restriction. This supports a conditional credential exposure warning, but does not establish covert theft or malicious intent.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The configured API key is sent to an endpoint that can be overridden through `OKO_EXCHANGE_URL`; the inspected code shows no destination restriction.
- The API key exchange runs when authentication is needed and an API key is present.
- The manifest has only a `prepublishOnly` lifecycle hook, which builds the package.
- The package entrypoint is an MCP server for OKO Stream and uses the API key for organizer authentication.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L1232A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/server.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.19.0.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.19.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.