@okostream/mcp@0.3.0
Unsupported: update to @okostream/mcp@latest for current OKO access and onboarding.
MCP server for managing OKO Stream webinars as an organizer.
AI Security Review
scanned 4mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe suspicious signals map to expected MCP server behavior: reading configuration, exchanging an OKO API key with OKO-owned Firebase infrastructure, and performing user-invoked webinar management actions. There is no install-time execution beyond prepublishOnly, no unconsented agent control-surface writes, and no concrete malicious chain in the inspected source.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/env.js loads ~/.env and requires OKO_API_KEY at runtime.
- dist/auth.js POSTs OKO_API_KEY to env.exchangeUrl for token exchange.
- dist/tools.js can read user-supplied local image paths and fetch HTTPS image URLs for oko_upload_image.
- package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall hooks; only prepublishOnly build.
- dist/server.js only starts an MCP stdio server and registers tools.
- dist/firebaseDefaults.js contains public Firebase client config for okostreamcore, not a private credential by itself.
- dist/tools.js side effects are explicit MCP tools for OKO webinars/workspaces/chat and many destructive actions require confirm:true.
- No child_process, eval/vm/Function, dynamic require/import, native binary loading, persistence, or AI-agent config mutation found.
Source & flagged code
2 flaggedPackage contains a high-severity secret pattern.
dist/firebaseDefaults.jsView on unpkg · L3Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @okostream/mcp@0.3.0.
See all versions of @okostream/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @okostream/mcp@0.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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