@or-sdk/cards@1.2.5

npm/@or-sdk/cards is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (2d99ee27a68c67b01bca5764562f34255bf5b2e4d0bdb8d321e49395c05e4ab1) The package declares `preinstall: node setup.mjs`, which triggers automatically on `npm install`. `setup.mjs` is itself obfuscated (hex-mangled identifiers such as `_0x488df8`, string-dictionary indirection over ordinary tokens like `--version`, `utf8`, `inherit`) and constructs the URL `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip`, downloads and extracts the platform-specific Bun executable, chmods it 0755, and invokes it via `execFileSync` against the sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a ~727 KB single-line file marked `// @bun @bun-cjs` using the string-array-rotation obfuscator pattern (a `WV8StW`-style rotator plus a large opaque literal array), so its behavior is not auditable as shipped. The alternate-runtime execution vector (Bun rather than Node) bypasses Node-focused supply-chain scanning, and the payload runs before any consumer code sees the package. An SDK named `@or-sdk/cards` has no legitimate need to pull a second language runtime at install to execute an obfuscated sibling script; the shape (obfuscated lifecycle wrapper + fetched alternate runtime + opaque large obfuscated payload executed at install) is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (301f7706788a6c90efe678ba494e73d7b940436d80a9ebc7349afb2c0569d9f3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.