@or-sdk/deployments@2.1.5

npm/@or-sdk/deployments is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (f2cb326bb35bb3a4c24b9b16efb74d0a3cd5a422c55ca4b779794c738c774abc) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style _0x-prefixed identifiers, wrapper-object property proxies) and, on npm install, downloads a Bun runtime archive for the host platform and architecture from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods the binary executable, and invokes it with the sibling file math_init.js as its argument. math_init.js is a 727 KB single-line bundle protected by a shuffled string-array plus rotator function (WV8StW pushes/shifts the array), rendering it non-auditable in shipped form. Executing an obfuscated bundle under an alternate language runtime pulled at preinstall time gives the publisher arbitrary code execution on every installing machine and evades Node-based static and dynamic analysis. The Bun download itself is from Bun's official GitHub release host, but the delivery vehicle for the code that actually runs is the shipped obfuscated math_init.js — a deployments SDK has no legitimate need to fetch a second language runtime at preinstall and hand it an opaque sibling file. ## Source: ghsa-malware (76881d7093e65148a2541e98b8e0218bc00a5cd20e7569be795b33b3b9379581) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.