@or-sdk/library-source@0.4.5

npm/@or-sdk/library-source is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (4ad57c7ae12967c16bf007f44d2674ae6aa785c8affbc87c276e5f27d42877cf) On `npm install`, the package's preinstall script `node setup.mjs` downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then invokes it against a shipped 727 KB Bun-compiled bundle `math_init.js` via `execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D,'math_init.js')])`. setup.mjs itself is transformed with obfuscator.io-style `_0xNNNNNN` identifier renaming and per-function string-property maps that reconstruct strings such as `/etc/os-release`, `--version`, and `Alpine` at runtime. `math_init.js` is a Bun-serialized CJS blob (header `// @bun @bun-cjs`) using a rotated constant array + numeric-index string synthesis decoder (`function WV8StW(a,b,c){for(c=0;c<b;c++)a.push(a.shift());return a}`), shipped without source or documentation. The package presents itself as an SDK type-library, which has no need for a second language runtime or a compiled opaque blob at install time. The combination of an obfuscated install-time script, an alternate-runtime fetch used solely to execute a sibling file (evading Node-level inspection and lifecycle hooks visibility), and an opaque compiled payload is the alternate-runtime-dropper attack pattern: arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes on the installer's host under the installing user's privileges on `npm install`, and its behavior cannot be verified from the shipped source. ## Source: ghsa-malware (693b5d59850ff1077ccfb406194192d349868f21202fbf7656dedbd7702ac930) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.