OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-11711 confirms this npm version as malicious. npm/@or-sdk/lookup is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account...
Source
OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in @or-sdk/lookup (npm)
Details
npm/@or-sdk/lookup is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (1be2bd06307ffe693ddf0e48cb25a1f006a1e17f526ba6d5144d2b739afae329) The package's `preinstall` script runs `node setup.mjs`, an obfuscated bootstrapper that downloads the Bun runtime from `github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>` (chmod +x) and then invokes it via `execFileSync` against a bundled 727KB sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is protected with obfuscator.io-style transforms (shuffled string-array with a rotator function, hex-obfuscated identifiers, custom string decoder) and is not declared in `package.json.files`; it executes only via the freshly-installed alternate runtime and cannot be inspected without execution. The advertised purpose of the package is a Weaviate lookup SDK, which does not require shipping and running an alternate JavaScript runtime against an opaque bootstrap payload at install time. The CHANGELOG links to `gitlab.internal.onereach.io/onereach/platform/or-sdk-next`, an internal GitLab URL, while the package is published to public npm under the `@or-sdk` scope, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting OneReach.ai developers. `npm install @or-sdk/lookup` results in execution of attacker-controlled obfuscated code on the installer's host under a runtime the installer did not previously have.
## Source: ghsa-malware (efa0cab32934490253053ffa8f565c9ce204b5db2d13838160f13f1c3a91c2d8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.