Details
npm/@or-sdk/markdowner is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (24647d4ef5b949cc9e0cc0def4a96937e348051a3635861bac07b119e82358c7) The package declares a `preinstall` hook (`node setup.mjs`) that runs automatically on `npm install`. setup.mjs detects the installer's platform/arch, downloads the Bun runtime binary from the oven-sh/bun v1.3.13 GitHub release zip, extracts and chmod+x's `bun`/`bun.exe` to a temp directory, then execFileSync's it against a sibling file `math_init.js` shipped in the tarball. `math_init.js` is a single-line 727 KB obfuscated JavaScript bundle (Bun-CJS header, string-array rotation via `WV8StW` cycling constant array `n7gIxM`, per-string decoder `hc1jfK9`, hex-mangled globals) whose network destinations are reconstructed at runtime from fragments rather than appearing as plain literals. The package presents itself as a markdown SDK but its `package.json` has empty `description`, empty `author`, and no `repository` field, and none of the declared purpose requires an alternate runtime or a multi-hundred-KB obfuscated init bundle. The result is that `npm install @or-sdk/markdowner` fetches a second interpreter for the sole purpose of running opaque, obfuscated code on the installer's host, bypassing any inspection of the JavaScript by Node's normal loader.
## Source: ghsa-malware (d52c89f01be2e67fe11c0909a22550d9964f08253fa719f1eab37b49f35d35e8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.