@or-sdk/notifications@1.7.5

npm/@or-sdk/notifications is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (fdcf70ecb17f9ec2983aed801ebfbc192e3a5f28ebc522f885a2f52492596637) The package's preinstall hook runs `node setup.mjs`, which downloads the Bun runtime binary from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases archive, extracts and chmods it executable in a temp directory, and then invokes it against `math_init.js` — a tarball-shipped 727KB single-line JavaScript bundle obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style string-array rotation (large numeric/string constant array shuffled by a rotator function, hex-named identifiers). setup.mjs itself uses the same hex-identifier and property-indirection obfuscation to hide its child_process/https/fs calls. The package's declared purpose is a notifications SDK — a Zod-schema wrapper whose only declared dependencies are `@or-sdk/base` and `zod`, with a pure-TypeScript `dist/`. There is no native-build or runtime rationale for fetching a separate JavaScript runtime at install time or for executing a 700KB opaque payload named `math_init.js`. The alternate-runtime shape (running the payload under freshly-fetched Bun rather than the Node process performing the install) evades Node-resolved static analysis of the payload's behavior. Cover-story naming (`math_init`) and obfuscation of both the loader and the payload are consistent with deliberate concealment of install-time code execution against the installer. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ccf75656732c39bcd3270ca8b70fd49b62be40d4928b690cb1fa3caeb906898f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.