@or-sdk/payments@3.2.6

npm/@or-sdk/payments is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (23288c24256dc118848cf72b327fb59d65a8d85a1400370b0f49127de553e112) The package's preinstall hook (scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs") runs setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>, unpacks it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and then invokes it via execFileSync against a bundled 727KB file math_init.js. math_init.js is heavily obfuscated (string-array-shuffle with rotating array WV8StW, large mixed const array n7gIxM, custom decoder hc1jfK9) and carries a `// @bun @bun-cjs` header confirming it is intended to run under the freshly downloaded Bun binary. Executing an opaque bundled payload via a just-downloaded alternate runtime at npm install time evades Node-based inspection and runs attacker-controlled code with the installer's privileges. The package is published on public npm as @or-sdk/payments, but its CHANGELOG.md references only gitlab.internal.onereach.io — the scope corresponds to an internal-only SDK, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting OneReach.ai developers. A payments SDK has no legitimate reason to download a second language runtime to execute its own obfuscated bundle at install time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (060f5bbaceab5a306ba2d9a61356db85ab65745720ff39abbc87b06755af4e9f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.