OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-11719 confirms this npm version as malicious. npm/@or-sdk/permissions-lambda is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account...
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OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in @or-sdk/permissions-lambda (npm)
Details
npm/@or-sdk/permissions-lambda is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (b15436d4e07420294a682bd8facddda083ad57a069b485579e468b638b29a675) The package declares `preinstall: node setup.mjs`. `setup.mjs` downloads the Bun runtime binary from oven-sh/bun GitHub releases into a temp directory, chmods it executable, and uses it to run the sibling file `math_init.js` via `execFileSync`. `math_init.js` is a 728 KB single-line obfuscator.io-style payload (rotated string-array `WV8StW`, custom-alphabet decoder `hc1jfK9`, `_0x*` mangled identifiers, `@bun @bun-cjs` header) with runtime-assembled string fragments (email-shaped and URL-shaped tokens) that cannot be resolved without executing the decoder. The advertised purpose of the package is a ~20-line AWS Lambda invocation wrapper at `dist/cjs/index.js`, which has no functional need for a second JavaScript runtime, and no source for `math_init.js` exists in `src/`. The CHANGELOG points to an internal OneReach GitLab (`gitlab.internal.onereach.io`), while the shipped `preinstall` + obfuscated blob are absent from that source tree — consistent with a malicious release of an otherwise internal `@or-sdk/*` package. The alien-runtime fetch is used solely to execute the shipped opaque blob, evading Node-based scanners and hooks.
## Source: ghsa-malware (f413bb8801433c520b73c4f602525bd70dad8630293ff833354da274669fffe4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.