Details
npm/@or-sdk/source-api is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (c17adf233bc2b9714d4b0c295aae3cb70a1e66b5183bfaf03024011de418e7b2) On `npm install`, the package's `preinstall` script runs `setup.mjs`, which downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases and immediately invokes it via `execFileSync(bunPath, [math_init.js],...)` to execute a sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB obfuscated JavaScript payload (hex-mangled identifiers, shuffled string-array with rotating shuffle function, custom string decoder), executed under an alternate runtime that Node-based tooling and reviewers do not analyze — the alternate-runtime dropper pattern. The `@or-sdk` scope corresponds to an internal OneReach namespace (`gitlab.internal.onereach.io/onereach/platform/or-sdk-next` per CHANGELOG.md), so this publicly-published package under the same scope is positioned to hit developers or CI that resolve `@or-sdk/*` from the public npm registry rather than an internal mirror — a dependency-confusion / scope-squat vector. The combination of scope-squat lure, alternate-runtime execution vector, and heavily obfuscated install-time payload conceals the executed behavior from install-time review and hands arbitrary code execution to the payload on every install.
## Source: ghsa-malware (0eac1536a62eb6494270164acac98bacbab9590e442ee67145f689a41cefbd50) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.